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The Sentencing Controversy:
Punishment and Policy in
the War Against Drugs
INTRODUCTION
WHAT FRANKEL HATH WROUGHT
DONALD W. DowD*
T HE early 1970s was a period of uneasy consensus on the goals
and procedures of sentencing.' Most states and the federal
government had adopted individualized sentencing giving wide dis-
cretion to the sentencing judge and if a sentence of imprisonment
was imposed wide discretion to a parole board.2 Individualized sen-
tencing emphasized the rehabilitative goal.3 Of course, the other
goals of sentencing were not ignored.4 Quite apart from rehabilita-
tion, a maximum and a minimum usually not more than one half
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
1. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FurruR CiuAvs 3 (1985). Prior to the 1970s,
a consensus was evident on the goals of sentencing. Id. Today, this agreement no
longer exists. Id.
2. Id. at 20-21. Detailed standards for sentencing are a recent development.
Id. at 20. Typically, other than statutory maximums for sentences "It]here were
few other limits placed on sentencing judges' discretion, and almost no guidance
provided for the exercise of that discretion." Id. Pennsylvania and Minnesota were
exceptions to this general rule. Id. at 21. Minnesota led the states in implement-
ing the idea of a sentencing commission. Id. Minnesota's legislature created a
Sentencing Guidelines Commission in 1978 and the guidelines were completed in
1980. Id. Shortly after Minnesota's guidelines became effective, Pennsylvania fol-
lowed Minnesota's lead and established its own sentencing commission. Id.
3. Id. at 3. Individualized sentencing allows for consideration of the of-
fender's needs and treatment when choosing a sanction. Id. This consideration is
aimed at rehabilitating the offender. Id.
4. Ami L. Feinstein et al., Federal Sentencing, 30 AM. CrM. L. REv. 1079, 1082.
While there may be agreement that the goal of the criminal justice system is to
control crime, "scholars dispute whether the ultimate goal of punishment is to
provide just retribution for a given crime, to deter future criminals, to incapacitate
dangerous offenders, or to rehabilitate wayward citizens." Id.
(301)
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the maximum sentence could be imposed that reflected thejudge's
opinion of the seriousness of the offense and thus reflected the re-
tributive goal.5 To emphasize retribution, however, smacked of ir-
rational revenge and was in bad odor. As to the deterrence goal,
the severity of the maximum sentence might frighten some of those
disposed to crime and deter their actions. 6 But, it was difficult to
show in most cases how or how much offenders altered their behav-
ior because of sentencing practices. 7 Another goal in sentencing
might be incapacitation, that is to remove dangerous offenders
from society for public safety.8 Any sentence of imprisonment
achieves this goal for the term of imprisonment. To select a sen-
tence that would extend imprisonment or imprison those who
otherwise might not be imprisoned on this basis would, however,
require the judge to predict future conduct rather than punish past
conduct. Judges were uncomfortable in placing too much reliance
on this goal. They were wary of their gifts of prophecy.
The assumptions behind the consensus on individualized sen-
tencing with its rehabilitative goal were under attack from all sides.9
On the left, it was asserted that the exercise of discretion by the
judges and the parole boards had resulted in unequal justice, op-
pressing the poor and minority races.1 0 In 1971, the American
Friends Service Committee issued an influential report "The Strug-
gle ForJustice" which contained a scathing criticism of discretion in
5. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1941 (1988). The concepts of deter-
rence and rehabilitation, while the prevailing view during the 1950s, have seen the
emphasis shift recently toward a model of punishment based on retribution and
incapacitation. Id. However, no single purpose of punishment has "reigned
supreme." Id.
6. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 7-9. The theory behind the deterrence school
was that "it is still a fundamental fact of social life that the risk of unpleasant conse-
quences is a very strong motivational factor for most people in most situations"
and, therefore, the threat of sanctions ensured compliance. Id. at 7-8.
7. Id. at 95. The difficulty in assessing the deterrent effect of penalties is still
present. Id.
8. Id. at 24-25. The theory behind incapacitation is that "the prison prevents
offenders from being able to commit further crimes while confined." Id.
9. Martin L. Forst, Sentencing Disparity: An Overview of Research and Issues, in
SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERIMENTS IN REDUCING DIsPARrlm 9, 18-19 (Martin L. Forst
ed., 1982). The assault on the individualized sentencing model came from various
sources. Id. at 18. The attacks came from "academics, the judiciary, correctional
administrators, a wide spectrum of politicians, and even prisoners." Id.
10. Id. at 17-18. Critics began to question the fairness and justice of individu-
alized sentencing. Id. at 18. The concern centered on sentencing inequalities that
may have resulted from biases based on race, religion, social class, nationality "and
similar factors not related to the aims of the rehabilitative philosophy." Id. at 17.
Supporters of individualized sentencing, however, argued that the individual dif-
ferences between offenders justifiably related to correctional goals. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 40: p. 301
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sentencing and in parole and called for its complete abolition."
The assumption behind this reform was that the poor and people
of color would then enjoy the justice that had been available to the
rich and that had been given to white citizens.' 2 After sorrowfully
noting the failure of another Quaker-sponsored reform, the report
stated:
This is not the only example in the field of criminal justice
of a reform that backfired completely. Out of the best in-
tentions in the world can grow an increase in human mis-
ery. We will be mindful of this as we examine and
propose changes in the institutions of human justice. 13
One wonders what after almost a quarter of a century the authors
now think of this "reform" of abolishing judicial discretion. 14
On the righi, critics called for more and more mandatory
sentences to punish and deter.' 5 Andrew von Hirsch urged that the
only real justification for different punishments is the seriousness of
the crime being punished.' 6 Retribution was advocated not as re-
11. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT
ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 124-44 (1971). The report advocated aban-
doning the rehabilitative approach and applying a uniform approach. Id. at 143.
The problem with the discretionary model was that discretion allowed the princi-
ples of justice and legality, which depend on the uniform application of rules, to
be twisted. Id. at 125. A uniform approach would not deal generally with an indi-
vidual's character but "only with a narrow aspect of the individual, that is, his [or
her] criminal act or acts." Id. at 145.
12. Id. at 15-16.
13. Id. at 19. The failed reform involved an attempt to alter the basic struc-
ture of the penal system. Id. at 18. Philadelphia Quakers in an effort to enable
prisoners to reform themselves built a prison in which the inmates were kept in
total solitary confinement. Id. While the approach was never fully implemented
due to cost restrictions, there was little evidence that it aided in reforming the
prisoners. Id.
14. The current controversy over the disparity between the mandatory mini-
mum sentences imposed for crack cocaine and powdered cocaine illustrates how
discretionary sentencing can have a devastating effect on minorities and the poor.
For a discussion of the disparity between the mandatory minimum imposed for
crack cocaine and powdered cocaine, see Stewart Dalzell, One Cheer for the Guide-
lines, 40 VIL. L. REv. 317, 327 n.53 (1995).
15. Forst, supra note 9, at 21. Advocates of law and order sought an end to
discretionary sentencing which allowed judges and parole boards to be "soft on
crime." Id. Critics on the right began looking for a means to control decision-
makers and reduce disparity by preventing the early release of dangerous
criminals. Id.
16. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 171. According to von Hirsch, selecting a
rationale for sentencing depends on "underlying assumptions" about crime con-
trol. Id. He argues that punishments based on the gravity of crimes recognizes
offenders as persons capable of choice and accountable to their degree of fault.
Id. Longstanding traditions of choice and culpability in criminal law are consistent
with this concept. Id.
1995]
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venge but as 'Just deserts." 17 James Q. Wilson and others insisted
that incapacitation should be a chief goal. 18 They claimed that we
could identify the kind of offender who accounts for most of dan-
gerous street crime and insure public safety by sentencing on the
basis of whether the offender could be so classified. 19 Moreover,
the whole concept of rehabilitation was put into question in a major
study reviewing rehabilitative programs in prisons by Lipton, Mar-
tinson and Wilks which suggested that "nothing works."20
Even those who supported individualized sentencing and had
faith in the rehabilitative goal were concerned with the gross and
irrational disparity that too often occurred. 21 They insisted that the
problem could be solved not by abandoning discretion but by struc-
turing the exercise of discretion more carefully.22 They argued that
more information should be made available to the judge through
better pre-sentence reports and sentencing hearings. Legislation
should set forth the alternatives available to the judge and some
17. Peter A. Ozanne, Judicial Review, in SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERIMENTS IN
REDUCING DISPARITY 177, 195 (Martin L. Forst ed., 1982). The contemporary ver-
sion of retributivism is known as 'Just deserts." Id. Under the theory of 'Just
deserts," the factors relevant to the sentencing decision include the circumstances
of the crime relating to its severity and the prior record of the offender. Id. at 180-
81.
18. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 8-9, 116. Incapacitation as a goal of sentenc-
ing is based upon the belief that by removing from circulation for a certain period
of time those persons convicted of crimes an incapacitative effect would result. Id.
at 116. Those persons imprisoned would be prevented from offending while in
prison. Id. Wilson was a leading advocate of this strategy. Id. Wilson asserted that
since most major felonies are perpetrated by a small number of repeat offenders
prison sentences would remove the frequently convicted felons from circulation
and benefit society. Id. at 8.
19. Id. at 8-9. Wilson and others espousing the incapacitation theory argued
that those who repeatedly committed felonies "sooner or later are caught and con-
victed." Id. at 8. Individual predictions, therefore, would not be involved in such
an analysis. Id. Those imprisoned would be repeat offenders and would eliminate
the concern present with individualized sentencing about overlooking actually
dangerous convicts. Id.
20. DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT:
A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES 3 (1975). The authors of the study
stated three purposes for which their information could be used. Id. at 4. First,
the study showed that several assumptions about the prison system accepted on an
"a priori basis" may not in fact be true. Id. Second, the study was to serve as an
information base. Id. Third, the survey reflected the need for new ideas in the
area of corrections. Id.
21. Forst, supra note 9, at 21. Even "liberals" were concerned about reducing
disparity. Id. Both judges and penologists have expressed considerable skepticism
about the value of rehabilitation. Ogletree, supra note 5, at 1941.
22. Forst, supra note 9, at 20. While accepting the validity of individualized
sentencing, many legal scholars have suggested "piecemeal measures" to deal with
the disparity in sentencing. Id. Suggested measures include the formation of sen-
tencing institutes and sentencing councils. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 301
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criteria for selecting one or more of these alternatives. The judge
should state the reasons for his or her sentence and the sentence
should be reviewable not only one its legality, but on its reasonable-
ness.23 In 1972, a committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association
chaired by Judge Edmund Spaeth drafted legislation to accomplish
many of these reforms which became the Sentencing Procedure Act
which largely followed the procedures adopted in the Model Penal
Code. 24 Although parts of this law were "suspended" or, as some of
the legislators and drafters thought, gutted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the state remained committed to individualized
sentencing.
Also in 1972, a more radical and novel reform was advocated
by Judge Marvin Frankel in his book Criminal Sentences: Law Without
Order.25 After a critical review of the inadequacies of discretionary
sentencing and suggested reforms, he called for a Sentencing Com-
mission whose members would be drawn from a wide spectrum of
those concerned with criminal punishments, even ex-offenders.26
It would have a professional staff, and like other administrative
agencies could develop policies and adopt "rules" which would con-
trol sentencing discretion.27
On May 20 and 21 of 1976, the Institute for Correctional Law
held a conference at Villanova University School of Law entitled
"Sentencing in Pennsylvania" to consider what steps the state
should take to improve sentencing.2 8 As Director of the Institute, I
invited legislators, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, administra-
tors and officers from correctional departments and boards of pro-
bation and parole, scholars, concerned citizens from non-
governmental agencies and ex-offenders to come and exchange
23. Id. Proposed changes to the individualized justice model included a re-
quirement that a judge state the reasons for the sentencing decision as well as
appellate review of sentences. Id.
24. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1386 (1972) (current version at 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9701-9781 (1982 & Supp. 1995).
25. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHouT ORDER 3 (1973).
Judge Frankel devotes the second half of his book to laying out his proposed reme-
dies and directions of hope. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 120. Judge Frankel envisioned a sentencing commission which
would be composed of "lawyers, judges, penologists, and criminologists" and
others with some knowledge of prisons and sentencing. Id.
27. Id. at 122. Judge Frankel noted the lack of sentencing in law school cur-
riculum, the lack of training on sentencing issues for judges and the absence of
any guidelines to assist judges in eliminating disparities. Id. at 12-15. The pro-
posed commission would formulate rules for the implementation of sentences and
ensure that the rules were enforced effectively and objectively. Id. at 121-22.
28. Sentencing in Pennsylvania, 1976 INST. CORRECTIONAL LAW iv.
19951
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their ideas - the very people who could serve on Judge Frankel's
Sentencing Commission.2 9 Judge Frankel, himself, gave the closing
remarks. 30 After deploring the cry from politicians for harsh
mandatory or mandatory minimum sentences and the reluctance of
judges to accept review of their sentences, he returned to the idea
of a Sentencing Commission and sentencing guidelines.31 The idea
had matured into a bill, S. 2699, which had been introduced by his
new disciple Senator Edward Kennedy with broad bi-partisan
support. 32
Judge Frankel enthusiastically described the advantages of this
bill. He said:
It would provide for appellate review. But most im-
portantly, for my purposes here and for my purpose to tell
you what might be of interest in the Federal sphere, it
would create a Commission on Sentencing. This would be
a full-time Commission ....
Its most basic function-which is why I think well of it
and hope it comes to pass-is to do something which no
official group or agency has really ever done, and that is,
to pay sustained, full-time, steady, unepisodic, unpub-
licized attention to the problems of sentencing. This
would be its field. The ways it would pay attention in-
clude, among others, research, gathering of information,
dissemination of information -all matters of the first
consequence in the Federal courts. I have to make a spe-
cial investigation in my building, where there are 25
judges, to find out what other people have given this year
29. Id. at iii-iv.
30. Id. at 222-37. Judge Frankel discussed in his remarks the punitive charac-
ter of the American system of sentencing as well as the discretion afforded all those
involved in the criminal justice. Id. at 224, 226. According to Judge Frankel,
discretion is exercised from the cop on the beat to the sentencing judge to the
parole board. Id. at 226.
31. Id. at 231-32, 227-30. Judge Frankel acknowledged that sentencing is a
very "delicate, sensitive and emotional business." Id. at 228. While avoiding an
attack on judges, Judge Frankel believes that to an extent judges' resistance to
appellate review stems from jealousy in guarding their occupational pleasures and
prerogatives. Id. He notes that, at least in the Federal system, the resistance to
appellate review comes from the appellate judges. Id. at 229. Whether it stem
from an avoidance of extra work or the avoidance of a task with little glory, appel-
late judges avoided the role. Id. at 229-30.
32. Id. at 233. The bill had a variety of co-sponsors. Id. Other senators sup-
porting the legislation included individuals from left to right on the political spec-
trum including Senators Aberesk, Hruska and McClellan. Id. The Administration
led by President Ford supported the legislation as well. Id.; see S. 2699, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
306 [Vol. 40: p. 301
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for mail fraud, and so on. To me it's a subject of interest,
but obviously, it's not of interest to other Federal judges,
because it's not something that is regularly distributed,
and I'm told it's not even regularly asked for, because eve-
rybody does his own thing about sentencing, and whatever
the other fellow does is his business.
For me, the beauty of this Commission-like the
beauty of other full-time agencies-is that it would have
ongoing concern with these things.... These guidelines
would have a kind of presumptive force under this bill.
That is to say, very briefly, they are tied in with the provi-
sion for appellate review, and the statute would provide
that if a sentence was within the guidelines of the statute
itself, and within any guidelines that came to be promul-
gated by this Commission, then it would be reversible on
appeal, only if it was clearly unreasonable.
That's the scope of review for a sentence within the
guidelines. It would leave the sentencing judge free to
sentence outside the guidelines, and of course, he would
explain why. And then it provides that a sentence outside
the guidelines is reversible if it is unreasonable. So it is
more subject to reversal if it's outside the guidelines. It
must be found merely to be unreasonable. If it's within
the guidelines, it can only be reversed if it is clearly unrea-
sonable .... 33
Judge Frankel then passed out copies of the bill with missionary
zeal.A4 He found many converts, chief of whom was Representative
(nowJudge) AnthonyJ. Scirica.a5 AsJudge Frankel was to be father
of the United States Sentencing Commission, Judge Scirica was to
be the father of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission.3 6
33. Id. at 233-36.
34. Id. at 236. In preparation of his appearance,Judge Frankel procured cop-
ies of the bill from Sen. Kennedy's office. Id. The bills were made available to
interested participants. Id.
35. Id. at 201-02. Representative Scirica questioned how to remove the dis-
parity that results from unnecessary discretionary power. Id. at 202. While ac-
knowledging he may prefer on a given issue to follow the dictates of the Supreme
Court procedural rules committee, Representative Scirica felt the issue of sentenc-
ing was too important not to be treated to the legislative process. Id. at 200-01.
36. Judge Scirica was a proud father even before Judge Frankel's brain-child
was born. Pennsylvania established a Sentencing Commission in 1978 and enacted
its first guidelines in 1982. See 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 9701-9781 (1982 &
Supp. 1995); 204 PA. CODE ch. 303 (1994) (Sentencing Guidelines).
1995]
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Sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines seemed to
offer something for everyone. A commission could issue guidelines
protecting minorities and the poor from discrimination and assur-
ing equal justice. It could consider the concerns of those who advo-
cated a 'just deserts" model by making sure that the guidelines
focused on the circumstances of the crime not just the criminal.
With its professional expertise, it could examine the claims of those
who favored selective incapacitation by scientifically determining
which offenders were most likely to create a continuing danger to
the public. Because the commission would consider the minimum
sentence appropriate for each offence in setting guidelines, there
would be no need for statutory minimum sentences to control too
lenient judges.
Less than a month after the conference, Judge Frankel had
every reason to redouble his efforts to push for a Sentencing Com-
mission and guidelines. He was faced with sentencing a sixty-four
year old rabbi in a 1.2 to 2.5 million dollar Medicare and tax fraud
nursing home case.37 After a extensive sentencing hearing, Judge
Frankel sentenced Rabbi Bergman to four months imprisonment.38
In a sentencing memorandum, he carefully stated the reasons for
this sentence.3 9 The sentence was widely criticized. The Special
Prosecutor Charles J. Hynes protested by stating:
37. United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The
rabbi, Bernard Bergman, pled guilty to two counts of an 11-count indictment re-
sulting from an investigation into Medicaid fraud. Id. at 497-98. The defendant
was the subject of an investigation into fraudulent claims for Medicaid funds in
New York nursing homes. Id. at 498. The defendant pled guilty to count one of
the indictment in which he confessed to knowingly and wilfully participating in a
scheme to defraud the United States through the presentation of padded claims
for payments under the Medicaid program to the defendants nursing home. Id.
The defendant also admitted to participating in the false filing of a partnership
return. Id. The return failed to list people who had bought partnership interests
from the defendant in his nursing homes, had paid for such interests and had
made certain capital withdrawals. Id.
38. Id. at 497.
39. Id. at 498. While acknowledging that the conspiracy to defraud for which
the defendant pled guilty was not the gravest of nursing-home wrongs, Judge Fran-
kel noted that the sentence was "imposed for two federal felonies including, as the
more important, a knowing and purposeful conspiracy to mislead and defraud the
Federal Government." Id. at 498. Judge Frankel asserted that two sentencing con-
siderations demanded a prison sentence in this case. Id. at 499. First, the aim of
general deterrence and discouraging others likely to commit similar crimes sup-
ported a term of imprisonment. Id. Second, the related concern that a lesser pen-
alty would "depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime" supported Judge
Frankel's sentence. Id. Judge Frankel in support of his sentence stated that "[t] he
course of justice must be sought with such objective rationality as we can muster,
tempered with mercy, but obedient to the law, which, we do well to remember, is
all that empowers a judge to make other people suffer." Id. at 503.
308 [Vol. 40: p. 301
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I am extraordinarily disappointed by the sentence
that Dr. Bergman received today. One wonders whether
essential justice has been accomplished when a man such
as Bernard Bergman is given this kind of sentence.
I am deeply troubled and discouraged by the cynicism
generated by what the people consider to be special jus-
tice for the privileged.
I am also saddened about what our elderly must
think-those who lived in one of Bernard Bergman's
nursing homes. I believe they must feel abandoned and
alone once again.
As for those destined to spend tine in a nursing home
in later years-one out of every five elderly Americans will
do so-what are they to think?
Our continued investigation into the nursing home
industry may, I fear, be adversely affected by this sentence.
Concerned citizens, families and employees in nursing
homes where stealing and abuse is going on even today
may now think twice before cooperating with this office.
Morris Abram, in his Moreland Commission report to
the Governor, prophesied that if vigilance wasn't exer-
cised we could face a repeat of the nursing home scandal
in five or 10 years.
The sentence handed to Bernard Bergman today
does little to belie the fears expressed by Mr. Abram.
New York has done more than any other state to cor-
rect its nursing home problems: Millions of dollars and
vast amounts of manpower have been poured into the task
of cleaning up the nursing home industry.
If all this money and effort is not to be wasted, then
those who have abused the elderly and, in so doing, fash-
ioned for themselves a life of luxury, must learn that they
will go to jail for their crimes.
However, insubstantial prison sentences do not deter
me. I shall continue to vigorously investigate and prose-
cute criminals who thrive on abuse of our elderly
people.40
An editorial to the New York Times said:
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One of the most prominent current theories is that
sentences should serve to deter others from committing
similar crimes. Though this view is most regularly applied
to street crime, it would seem to be substantially more ap-
plicable to white-collar criminals to whom prison is much
more jarring than to criminals who live at society's eco-
nomic and social margins. Yet, Mr. Bergman now joins a
parade of formerly respectable white-collar criminals who
have received sentences which make the odds on white-
collar crime look rather good.
A second popular notion about sentencing is that it
should show the criminal justice system to be even-
handed. At a time when the Legislature is moving toward
mandatory sentences of three years for juveniles convicted
of serious crimes, a four-month sentence for a rich felon,
guilty of a million-dollar fraud, can only reinforce cyni-
cism about the realities of equal justice under law.4 1
On the other hand, Dean Monroe H. Freedman of Hofstra
Law School defended his participation in the sentencing hearing
on behalf of Bergman to angry students, stating that: 'Judge Fran-
kel did not write the opinion I had hoped for."42 He called the
sentence "a gross injustice," by stating that "I think Bernard Berg-
man should have spent no time at all."'4 3
While not in time to save Judge Frankel from this controversy,
Congress did establish the United States Sentencing Commission in
1984.44 The Commission did promulgate guidelines and the age of
federal guideline sentencing began. Whether guideline sentencing
has achieved the dreams of Judge Frankel, or whether it is yet an-
other "reform" gone awry is very much in dispute. The three pa-
pers that were presented at the Twenty Ninth Annual Villanova Law
Review Symposium, the two notes and a comment published in this
issue demonstrate that we have not yet entered into the promised
land envisioned by Judge Frankel.
In his paper, Judge Stewart Dalzell vividly describes the overall
41. EqualJustice, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1976, at A22.
42. Tom Goldstein, Dean Explains Role in Bergman Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
1976, at A35.
43. Id.
44. The Sentencing Reform Act created the United States Sentencing Com-
mission as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 235, 98 Stat. 2031 (1984), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-217, § 4, 99 Stat. 1728
(1985); Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 35, 100 Stat. 3599 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2,
101 Stat. 1266 (1987) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988)).
[Vol. 40: p. 301
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antipathy to the Guidelines felt by most federal District Court
judges and many commentators. 45 Acknowledging that he is in the
minority, he defends the Guidelines as greatly superior to the old
regime of unbounded discretion that Frankel wished to disman-
tle.46 However, he is not uncritical of the Guidelines, noting that
the standards for non-violent drug offenses compared to violent of-
fenses are "bizarre."47 He is uncomfortable with § 5H standards
which tell a judge in essence to ignore the characteristics of the
person he or she is sentencing, presumably to avoid the discrimina-
tion deplored in "The Struggle for Justice" and to focus Guidelines
on the crime, not the offender in line with the "just deserts" model
of sentencing. 48 He also doubts that many offenders understand
the reason for their sentences which are arrived at with the clarity
and humanity of ajudgment based on parsing the IRS code.49 Rob-
ert Kracht's extensive Comment, "A Critical Analysis of the Pro-
posed Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations Convicted of
Environmental Crimes," examines the kind of guideline practices
that give rise to this concern of Judge Dalzell. 50
When speaking at the conference on "Sentencing in Penn-
sylvania," Judge Frankel urged the adoption of guideline sentenc-
ing to forestall mandatory sentencing.51 As the reader will see in
the articles by Judge Margaret Spencer 52 and Eric Sterling 53 relat-
ing to the punishment of drug offenses, this hope is far from being
fulfilled. Congress has continued to impose harsh mandatory mini-
mum sentences that the Commission has been forced to follow and
the Commission has promulgated even higher minimum sentences
in its Guidelines. 54 To no one's great surprise, Congress has re-
sponded to public outcry, rational or irrational, genuine or manu-
45. See Dalzell, supra note 14, at 318.
46. Id. at 322-25.
47. Id. at 330.
48. Id. at 331-32.
49. Id. at 332-33.
50. See Robert L. Kracht, Comment, A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations Convicted of Environmental Crimes, 40 VILL. L. REv. 513
(1995).
51. SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVAN A 231-32 (Villanova University School of Law
Proceedings of the Institute for Correctional Law ed., 1976).
52. See Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addic-
tion, 40 VILL. L. REv. 335 (1995).
53. See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and
Reform, 40 VIL. L. REv. 383 (1995).
54. The Commission has considered the mandatory minimums as a baseline
and to make its own minimums meaningful, has added on to this. For a discussion
of calculating sentencing from mandatory minimums as a baseline, see Spencer,
supra note 52, at 344-45.
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factured. It has displayed neither the faith nor the courage to
adhere to its commitment to the procedures it established in the
Sentencing Reform Act.
Judge Frankel, as quoted above, also expected that the appel-
late review of sentences would be instrumental in bringing order to
sentencing.55 Roughly, sentences with the guidelines would be
presumptively reasonable while those outside the guidelines would
be presumptively unreasonable. Bryant D. Lim's note, "A Retreat
from Uniformity: Does Compliance with a Plea Agreement Justify
Downward Departure," reviews appellate practice under the Guide-
lines.56 Its very title indicates the heavy emphasis on uniformity as
the main characteristic of a reasonable sentence.5 7 The judge who
dares to deviate cannot base his or her sentence on all the facts of
the particular case, but only on those factors that could not have
occurred to the Commission in constructing its intricate grids and
guidelines. In most cases, this is not guiding discretion but negat-
ing discretion. This kind of sentencing is of course easier for the
lazy or the timid judge because a sentence within the guidelines
requires little explanation and can subject the judge to little criti-
cism. To the discomfort of many judges, however, the Guidelines
seem to offer the illusion, not the reality, of discretion and deprive
them of any meaningful discretion in sentencing.
In Kerry R. Northup's note on Nichols v. United States,58 we see a
case where a judge acting within the Guidelines imposed an en-
hancement of over two years in sentencing a defendant who had
pleaded guilty to a drug distribution offense.59 The enhancement
was based on a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol. 60 The case addressed the con-
stitutional question of whether the use of such a conviction for
enhancement violated the right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment.61 Justice Souter concurred in upholding the enhancement
on the grounds that it was not mandatory because under the Guide-
55. For a discussion of Judge Frankel's view of the appellate review of
sentences, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
56. See Bryant D. Lim, Note, A Retreat from Uniformity: Does Compliance with a
Plea Agreement Justify Downward Departure?, 40 ViLL. L. REv. 429 (1995).
57. See id. at 429 n.1, 433.
58. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
59. Id. at 1924; see Kerry R. Northup, Note, Nichols v. United States: Using
Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions to Enhance Sentences - A Dispute Resolved,
40 ViLE. L. REv. 475 (1995).
60. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. 1921.
61. Id.
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lines the defendant could have sought a downward departure. 62
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, noted the near impossibility of the de-
fendant being able to meet the Guideline standards for downward
departure.63 NeitherJustice commented on the fact that within the
Guidelines the judge had to apply the enhancement, whether or
not he thought it made sense to add more than two years to a sen-
tence because of a prior conviction based on plea of nolo con-
tendere and a $250 fine in a DUI case.64 They also did not note
that, had there not been a question of constitutionality raised by
the defendant, the sentence would not have been subject to any
appellate review because it was within the Guidelines.65 Is this the
extent of control of trial court discretion under guidelines and the
kind of appellate review foreseen by Judge Frankel and his
followers?
As the exercise of discretion under the Guidelines becomes
more limited, guideline sentences become more like mandatory
sentences and are open to the same criticism that discretion has not
been eliminated but shifted to the prosecutor. The prosecutor de-
cides whether and how charges are to be brought and such deci-
sions can vastly affect the punishments given under the Guidelines.
How the prosecutor characterizes assistance from the defendant
can also greatly affect the resultant sentence. The Sentencing Com-
mission does not control prosecutors and cannot issue "Sentencing
Guidelines For United States Attorneys." Was this shift of discre-
tion from the courts to the prosecutors contemplated by those ad-
vocating Judge Frankel's reform?
Paraphrasing Churchill's oft quoted aphorism about democ-
racy, Judge Dalzell says that guideline sentencing is the worst system
of sentencing except for all the other sentencing schemes. 66 Some
of those who were present at the beginning with Judge Frankel seri-
ously question this opinion. If the bad old system was in effect, the
sentencing judges would now be shackled with the rash of
mandatory and mandatory minumum sentences enacted since the
adoption of the Guidelines, but so are the courts under the Guide-
lines. Apart from these mandatory sentences, judges under the old
62. Id. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 1934-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. See United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting
lower court's finding that Nichols' prior conviction was based on plea of nolo con-
tendere for DUI, $250 fine and Nichols was not represented by counsel), aff'd, 114
S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
65. Id. at 406.
66. Dalzell, supra note 14, at 334.
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system in exercising their wide discretion could offer a flexible, ra-
tional, maybe even courageous response in the current punitive cli-
mate. Under today's Guideline sentencing, this discretion has been
greatly limited. We may have paid too much to reduce disparity,
hurting those we attempted to help.
Others of Judge Frankel's converts have kept their faith in
guideline sentencing but reject the dogma developed under the
present Guidelines. The quest for uniform sentencing and the fo-
cus on the crime and not the criminal has swallowed almost all
other objectives in sentencing. A guideline sentencing system, how-
ever, need not have this overwhelming emphasis. Under the Guide-
lines, it should be possible to make the punishment fit the crime-
and fit the criminal. A guideline sentencing system does not have
to create the extreme presumption that all relevant factors have
been considered by the experts who made the Guidelines and thus
the court may not reconsider these factors in sentencing with the
result that the principal function of appellate review is to insure
that this presumption is enforced. These restraints under the
Guidelines betray an excessive distrust of the sentencing judge and
a lack of faith in the ability of appellate courts to know and correct
such errors as the trial courts might make.
"Guidelines" could be, just as the word implies, aids to the
judge in sentencing, not blinders that inhibit the judge from impos-
ing what he or she thinks is a reasonable or even a compassionate
sentence. Of course, some judges might misinterpret or ignore the
guidelines and others might be unreasonably lenient or unreasona-
bly harsh. But most sentences would be well within the guidelines
and given a presumption of reasonableness would seldom be ap-
pealed and, if appealed, seldom be overturned. It should be possi-
ble, however, to correct sentences even within the guidelines. In
cases outside of the guidelines, the sentences would be scrutinized
carefully in the light of the facts of each case and the reasons given
by the judge for the sentence, giving due weight to the policies re-
flected in the guidelines. Appellate courts would do what they have
always done in the common law, approve or disapprove lower court
judgments and build precedents based on concrete cases to give
further guidance to the lower courts. This is the kind of guideline
sentencing envisioned by many who heard Judge Frankel's call al-
most twenty years ago here at Villanova University School of Law.
For those concerned with crime and punishment in America,
the last twenty years have not been a happy time. The explosion of
crime and the responses to this explosion have been a source of
314 [Vol. 40: p. 301
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anguish if not despair. But as the papers in this issue illustrate, the
debate goes on and the voice of reason has not been stilled. Judge
Frankel's brain-child, after a rocky childhood, may yet grow into
wise maturity.
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